TRANSCONTINENTAL DIALOGUES
ACTIVIST ALLIANCES WITH INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF CANADA, MEXICO, AND AUSTRALIA

EDITED BY
R. AÍDA HERNÁNDEZ CASTILLO, SUZI HUTCHINGS, AND BRIAN NOBLE
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This book is the product of a dialogue that began in December 2014, in the context of the annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association. At the initiative of the Committee on World Anthropologies (CWA), R. Aída Hernández Castillo and Brian Noble, two coeditors of this volume, were invited to organize a panel that gathered voices and experiences of Indigenous and non-Indigenous anthropologists from Canada, Mexico, and Australia, regarding the challenges of building alliances and producing knowledge together with Indigenous organizations and peoples. As a result, a panel was held with the complex title “Alliances of, with, as Indigenous Peoples: The Obligations and Actions of Anthropologies and Anthropologists in the Middle,” which aimed at encompassing several political and epistemological experiences. The CWA was founded in 2010 for the purpose of broadening the dialogues of the American Anthropological Association with other theoretical traditions, building transcontinental academic bridges. Among the committee’s objectives was to “engage a diversity of international voices and perspectives and involve both academic and applied anthropology in this endeavor.”

Although on its website, the CWA does not raise the issue of decolonization of anthropology and the geopolitics of knowledge, these types of initiatives enable encounters and the construction of new alliances that to a certain extent contribute to the processes of epistemic decolonization (to confront the colonial legacies in the way we produce knowledge), which are an integral part of the

Introduction

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political projects with which several of the authors of this book collaborate. The hegemony of U.S., British, and French anthropological traditions in academic programs around the world makes it urgent to include other theoretical traditions. Indeed, the imperative to decolonize the academy has been a central focus of Indigenous scholarship coming out of Latin America, New Zealand, Australia, the Pacific, and Canada since the 1990s. Since 1971 in the Declaration of Barbados, Indigenous representatives denounced the colonial role that anthropologists have played in the nation-building projects of Latin America, and they made a call for the decolonization of the social sciences.2 Other Indigenous intellectuals from the Abya Yala have written about the need to reject the colonial legacies that are being reproduced through Western knowledges in academic institutions (see Rivera Cusicanqui 2010; García Leyva 2012; Quidel Lincoleo 2015; Itzamná 2016).3

Epistemic colonialism has also been denounced by organized Indigenous women, since the beginning of the 1990s, who have rejected liberal feminisms and reasserted the need to recognize their collective rights as members of their communities, as a condition for the full exercise of their rights as women.4 They have also written about the principles of communality (comunalidad) and good living (buen vivir) as fundamental perspectives in the questioning of the civilizing project of the West. Activists and intellectuals of a new generation have theorized from what they call their sentípensar (feeling and thought) as women and Indigenous people. In their theorizations and through their political struggles, these young intellectuals strive for the principle of harmony and respect, central to communality, to become fundamental values in the struggle against gender violence.5

These works echo the groundbreaking writing of Linda Tuhiwai Smith (2012), whose work over the past two decades influenced a generation of Indigenous academics across the globe to reject colonial research paradigms, which insist the Indigenous other is the subject of research at the hands of non-Indigenous academics (Johnson and Larsen 2013). Rather, Indigenous knowledges theory (Smith 2012; Moreton-Robinson 2004, 2015; Watson 2015; Hutchings and Morrison 2017); Indigenous critical and plural thinking; Indigenousist theory (Rigney 2017; Martin and Mirrabooka 2003); feeling–thinking (senti–pensar) Indigenous theory (Méndez Torres 2013; López Itzin 2013); and Indigenous standpoint theory (Nakata 2007; Tur, Blanch, and Wilson 2010; Ardill 2014), in providing methods to decolonize academic inquiry, all call for the Indigenous researched to be respected as the Indigenous researcher, at the
This combines with the emergence of reflective accounts by Indigenous researchers about their journeys as academics. Many of these authors comment on their struggles to produce work that honors their Indigenous cultural traditions, while meeting the standards expected of them as students and teachers in the academy (e.g., Bainbridge 2016; Thomas 2013).

Johnson and Larsen (2013, 8) point out how difficult it is for Indigenous researchers as insiders to “negotiate the tricky ground” of the liminal space they occupy between researcher and researched. Nevertheless, the rewards of this position are immense in working toward community-determined outcomes. The position of insider is all the more taxing for those of us who are Indigenous anthropologists, as the Indigenous authors in this volume attest (Hutchings, Llanes-Ortiz, Pictou). The position of the inside researcher as connected to community is explored throughout all the chapters in this volume. As the authors illustrate, it has become essential to engage with Indigenous-centered knowledge, if the Indigenous peoples we work with as anthropologists are to be part of alliances and dialogues that ensure effective liberation strategies in Indigenous peoples’ everyday worlds, as well as in the academy.

This volume is therefore timely and innovative, in taking the disparate anthropological traditions of three regions, Canada, Mexico, and Australia, to explore how the interactions between anthropologists and Indigenous peoples, in supporting Indigenous activism, have the potential to transform the production of knowledge within the historical colonial traditions of anthropology.

What is presented in this book is, however, much more than this. In general, comparative studies on the struggles of Indigenous peoples under modern colonialism have been with those countries that have similar colonial invasion histories, such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, which are all part of the Commonwealth of Nations (formally the British Commonwealth) (e.g., Archer 2003; Scholtz 2006; Green 2007; Simpson 2010; Moreton-Robinson 2016). Or, the attention has been from those anthropologists working across the global north-south divide who work with Indigenous peoples within the same region such as Latin America (Assies, van der Haar, and Hoekema 2000; Brysk 2000; Hernández Castillo and Canessa 2012; Leyva, Speed, and Burguete 2008; Sánchez Néstor 2005; Sieder 2017) and Africa (ACHPR 2006; Laher and Sing’Oei 2014). A few books also compare the political struggles of Indigenous peoples in Canada and Mexico in relation to specific issues, such as women and the environmental problems they face (Altamirano-Jiménez 2016) and their demands for self-government (Cook and Lindau 2000).
This volume presents pieces that do not take the usual political or geographic paradigms as their starting point. The particular dialogues from the margins that we present in this book arise from a rejection of the geographic hierarchization of knowledge, notably one in which the global south continues to be the space for fieldwork, while the global north is the place for its systematization and theorization. The linguistic borders that separate Latin American academies from Australian, African, or Canadian academies further hinder knowledge dialogues. We recognize the geopolitical hierarchies among our three countries, and that producing academic knowledge in the English language allows Australian and Canadian anthropologists to engage more deeply with the hegemonic academias of the global north (for example with U.S. and northern European academic production). On the other hand, this positioning of the English language as a reflection of the broader heirarchies of British colonial regimes at the expense of an understanding of the dynamics of Indigenous/ non-Indigenous relationships in other parts of the world raises the specter of even deeper political and epistemic logics of neocolonial workings, particularly the marginalization and erasure of Indigenous languages themselves by both English and Spanish anthropologies in the field and within academic circuits.

Indigenous and non-Indigenous intellectuals who do not publish in English are barely quoted, or taken into consideration, in the theoretical debates of the North American and northern European academies. For these reasons, the efforts of the CWA to promote spaces of encounter and academic dialogues with other anthropological traditions is important for the decolonization of our discipline. In this case, English became the lingua franca that allowed us to share experiences and methodological and political pursuits, but we hope to be able to translate to Spanish our academic dialogues, for a broader audience in Latin America.

The interaction between anthropologists and the people they work with in Canada, Australia, and Mexico is the bases on which the authors in this volume explore the often unintended, but sometimes devastating repercussions of government policies (such as land rights legislation or justice initiatives for women) on Indigenous people’s lives. We hope that by contrasting experiences of colonial domination and anticolonial struggles in different national contexts, we can contribute to the development of a comparative analysis in anthropology that is so needed in a context of globalized structures of domination. We further envisage that by juxtaposing these divergent analyses in this volume, we present
new understandings for how Indigenous activism and academic inquiry can be combined to combat the insidious effects of modern colonialism on Indigenous peoples across the globe. This is timely because, as Indigenous scholar Glen Sean Coulthard (2014) warns, the new politics of recognition, whereby the state acknowledges the unique cultural presence of its Indigenous citizens, merely hides its coloniality, while it cements ongoing relations of power and domination by the state over its Indigenous subjects. New understandings of resistance, refusal, and resurgence, as presented by the authors in this volume, may offer the genesis of alternative ways forward and also ways to understand how these play out every day.

When drafting this introduction, we were able to corroborate the great scarcity of comparative studies between Canada, Mexico, and Australia; they are theoretical traditions that have developed in isolation from one another. Throughout the chapters of this book, however, we see that the challenges faced by anthropologists who bet on the coproduction of knowledge with Indigenous peoples and vindicate the ethical and methodological importance of activist research are similar in the three geographic spaces.

Despite the shared challenges, it is important to consider the differences in the relations between Indigenous peoples (Aboriginal, Indigenous, or First Nations, or named in their own languages, depending on their own self-denomination) with colonial and postcolonial nation-states. The different genealogies and specific forms of domination and dispossession in Canada, Mexico, and Australia have influenced Indigenous peoples’ strategies of resistance and the actions of the anthropologists who work with them as allies.

Different Colonial Genealogies

The lives of the Indigenous peoples of the three geographic regions covered in this book were deeply affected by colonial violence, territorial dispossession, and forced displacement imposed by colonial governments. The characteristics of the different colonial ventures, however, have had an influence on the forms of the struggles for rights, the types of political demands developed, and how the indigeneity discourse is articulated.

We do not intend here to engage in a deep historical reconstruction of the various colonial genealogies, but we would like to point out some of the
differences we found among the three regions. The various denominations used in Canada, Mexico, and Australia to refer to Indigenous peoples are themselves a product of these different colonial histories.

In the Canadian milieu, First Nations became a term of recognition most notably in the 1970s, with the formation of the Canada-wide chiefs organization, the Assembly of First Nations, though only after a long history of state oppression and territorial dispossession. These realities still persist, while made to look accommodating via a liberal modality, in the context of the current neo-colonial state. Historically, notably in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, autonomous Indigenous political societies were, de facto, acknowledged and engaged with as such by British colonial authorities via established military and trade alliances, and eventually via land-sharing compacts affirmed through various treaties. These treaties were subsequently and preponderantly ignored by the state, or subverted beneath imposed Crown legislation after the 1867 Confederation of Canada. Much of the subsequent state institutional controls were brutally assimilative, even genocidal, as has been discussed in regard to Indian residential schools and bureaucratically controlled oppressive reserve conditions.

Many Indigenous peoples who did not arrive at historical treaties nonetheless persisted in understanding the integrity of their political, territorial, and cultural societies, even while challenged by state practices that worked persistently to trivialize them through policies of withering cultural, political, and economic subordination, land dispossession, and enfranchisement into the settler polity and its imposed sovereign legal frameworks. Only in the period since the 1950s, with some slackening of state controls in relation to a developing post–World War II internationalist human rights ethos, have Indigenous nations been able to organize and begin to self-name as such, eventually arriving at the First Nations pluralist terminology. That said, in their own lands and communities, most Indigenous territorial collectives identify themselves variously in their own languages (e.g., Piikani Nation, Kwakwaka’wakw, Secwepemc, Anishinaabeg, Mi’kmaq), each of these identifying a people organized in their own distinct political society.

In Australia, the British treated the Indigenous populations differently than how it negotiated the settlement of its other colonies, including in Canada. Approximately 250 Aboriginal language groups were living on the continent at the time of the arrival of the first fleet of British ships at Botany Bay in 1788. Yet, Britain declared the country uninhabited, or terra nullius, and this established the legal relationship between Britain and the Indigenous population for
the next two hundred years. Under the guise of such legal title to land, Britain was not obliged to negotiate treaties with the Indigenous populations or take land by conquest. The legal position of Aboriginal Australians was reinforced by subsequent legislation enacted by the federal government and the separate states of Australia on the Federation of Australia in 1901. In 1967 a referendum saw significant changes to the legislative treatment of Indigenous people, because the majority of Australians voted to mandate the federal government to implement policies to benefit Aboriginal people. One of the most significant changes leading from this was the implementation of land rights legislation in the Northern Territory in 1976 and native title legislation almost twenty years later. Regardless, Aboriginal Australians continue to suffer significant discrimination, lower health outcomes, and an ongoing struggle for recognition of Aboriginal title to land. With the implementation of land rights, however, has also come an acknowledgment of equal status of Aboriginal Australians among an increasing number of the dominant population, culminating most recently with three elected Aboriginal members to federal Parliament in the most recent election of July 2016.

On the other hand, the wrongly termed “Indian peoples” of Mexico were integrated in colonial administrations since the sixteenth century, through a legal and geographic separation that created the so-called Republic of Indians and Republic of Spaniards. This implied the maintenance of the local power structures of the Republic of Indians, with a legal regime that was separate from, but inferior to, that of the Republic of Spaniards. In many regions, Indigenous people who were dispersed were concentrated in Indian pueblos, which became the main social and organizational space during and after colonial times. A sense of communal belonging was thus created, which is still important in contemporary political struggles. The policy of evangelization, witnessed in different ways in Canada and Australia, was partly responsible for this social and linguistic segregation but also for the maintenance of Indigenous languages, since in theory the Spanish Crown, unlike the British Crown, required evangelists to preach in Indigenous languages.

In the case of Australia, the legal fiction of the common-law rule of terra nullius was the ideological and moral justification for occupation and dispossession of Aboriginal lands, without treaty or payment. The fact that treaties were not negotiated with Indigenous peoples and that limited colonial political institutions were created for them, has set the subsequent history of treatment of Aboriginal Australians apart from all other colonized countries, including those
we discuss in this volume, Canada and Latin America. The arrival of Captain Arthur Phillip and his crew to Botany Bay in 1788 marked the beginning of the historically recognized European invasion of Australia. Before Phillip, Captain James Cook had already claimed eastern Australia for Great Britain, declaring the sovereignty of the British Crown over land that was considered “wasted and unoccupied.” These were the bases for the establishment of the first colonies, denying the existence of the Aboriginal population and, therefore, any right over the colonized lands. This position was legally ratified as recently as 1971 with the Gove land rights case (Milirrpum v. Nabalco Pty. Ltd.), in which Justice Richard Blackburn rejected the doctrine of Aboriginal title because it was overridden by the land being claimed by right of occupancy under conquered or ceded colonies.

On encountering peoples assumed to be nomadic and who apparently did not till or fence off their lands, the British colonizers imposed a right to take possession of those territories, which they considered “unoccupied.” It has, of course, been well documented that many Indigenous Australian language groups living in coastal regions of the country, such as southeastern South Australia and southwestern Western Australia, have complex land-holding systems based on long-term seasonal occupation of defined regions that defy a nomadic labeling (e.g., Bates [1938] 1966; Jenkin 1979; Berndt and Berndt 1993). For those peoples who may be categorized more stereotypically as nomadic, including Western desert peoples, the term is also a misnomer that belies the highly complex land-owning systems that dictate their community and religious practices (see, for example, Berndt 1959; Meggitt 1962; Munn 1970; Myers 1986; Bell 1993; and Holcombe, this volume, to name just a few).

The High Court decision in Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2) of 1992 saw the doctrine of terra nullius overturned. This watershed in Australian legal and political history, after more than two hundred years of European occupation, led to important changes in the national recognition of Aboriginal Australians as the original occupiers of the nation, culminating with the Native Title Act (1993) (Hutchings, this volume). Two decades prior, the battle by Indigenous peoples and their supporters for recognition of traditional Aboriginal occupation of Australia had been hard fought in the Northern Territory. In the 1970s, among the broader Australian population the political climate was ripe to support change to the conditions under which Aboriginal Australians lived and worked. After the Gurindji people walked off the Wave Hill pastoral property in the mid-1960s in protest over substandard wages and with the
adverse decision in the Gove land rights case, a populist land rights movement emerged. Eventually, as a result of the 1967 referendum to include Aboriginal people in federal government decisions, grassroots protests and general political pressure influenced the federal Labor government to introduce land rights legislation for the Northern Territory, over which it had jurisdiction. The Aboriginal Land Rights Act was implemented under the subsequent conservative Liberal-Country coalition government, led by Malcolm Fraser, in 1976, and influenced some state governments to introduce land rights in other regions under their specific jurisdiction.\(^\text{10}\)

Despite these legislative milestones affecting the treatment of Aboriginal Australians by the dominant population, government and church control over Aboriginal Australians has historically been uneven across the country. Regardless, the establishment of missions throughout Australia from the mid-1800s saw large-scale removal of Aboriginal children from their communities and the forced migration of Aboriginal people onto government reserves over many generations. A majority of these people have since become known as the Stolen Generation.\(^\text{11}\) Their experiences of removal have led to devastating disruptions to cultural knowledge and practice, which many Aboriginal Australians attempt to rectify with varying degrees of success, via their participation in litigated and negotiated outcomes under native title legislation (see Hutchings, this volume).

Canadian colonial hegemonies of dispossession echo certain elements of those met in Australia, but they have also diverged in crucial ways. For Canada’s Indigenous peoples, those in political societies now referred to as First Nations, a long, if uneven, tradition of alliance making is still central to their political and land struggles, begun as early as the seventeenth century. Indeed, the treaties at first signed with English colonial authorities in the eighteenth century, and then later around the time of Canadian Confederation in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, continued this tradition. The Peace and Friendship Treaties, discussed by L. Jane McMillan and Sherry M. Pictou in this book, emerged in the earlier period, without the encumbrance of territorial cession or land relation rights, though clearly indicating the mutual acknowledgment of a compact between “nations,” Indigenous ones and the British Crown. The later confederation treaties (see Asch 2014) were prompted by the 1763 Royal Proclamation, understood as Canada’s first constitutional instrument, facilitating later confederation, which required the Crown to enter into treaties with extant, de facto Indigenous nations. These treaties did involve land negotiations, but Indigenous nations consistently held that lands were shared, with only a cession to allow access for the purpose of
sharing worked out through continual relations. Regardless of such Indigenous understandings, the Crown inevitably made instrumentalist legal arguments that lands were absolutely ceded and surrendered.

By the latter part of the twentieth century, however, the Government of Canada had introduced a new tack, with land cession and modification of rights to assure this as a practically nonnegotiable aspect of what it referred to as “modern day treaties” or “comprehensive claims,” which many observers view instead as contracts, but ones that open up innovative cogovernance arrangements, if ultimately under Crown authority. The James Bay Cree, with whom Colin Scott (a contributor to this book) has collaborated, negotiated such comprehensive cogovernance agreements.

In the latter half of the nineteenth century, in what may be seen as the “high colonial” moment with its imposed civilizing imperative, Canada also put in place new strategies of population control, in the form of the oppressive 1876 Indian Act, which developed alongside, yet forcefully undermined, the treaty-making tradition between peoples. The act was undergirded by the 1867 British North American Act, the initiating constitutional instrument at the time of Canadian Confederation, which in sections 91 and 92 divided state, or Crown, jurisdictional powers between the federal and provincial governments, and then in section 91(24) presumptively subordinated “Indians” (Indigenous peoples) under Crown jurisdiction, as if the nation-to-nation dimension of treaties was artifactual and illusory.

This move superseded treaties, thereby giving all the more force to the Indian Act in its several iterations, all in a moment when the presumed superiority of European-based knowledge, so-called civilizational orders, and the expansive assertion of state sovereignty and possessiveness was taken for granted in the imperial colonial ethos of the time (Chakrabarty 2000). It was believed that it was the responsibility of the British Crown and its representatives to bestow agriculture, the gospel, civil education, property, and a European work ethic on Indigenous peoples, who were offensively seen as inferior to Europeans and to the immigrating settler polities through the visor of then-prevalent discourses of evolutionary scientific racism. The act set in place myriad colonizing practices, including state-controlled reserve land systems, state-dictated blood status and band membership rules, strict cultural and ceremonial prohibitions, and acculturating, ethnocentric schooling practices in the form of the oft-brutal Indian residential schooling system, all of which worked together to underwrite dispossession and effective ethnocide—some argue genocide—in the name of a civilizing superiority of the settler polity.
The act displaced the sociopolitical authority sustained by First Nations in their lands, through the unilateral passing of statutory jurisdiction to the federal Department of Indian Affairs. Through this new department, the Crown became responsible for “caring for and civilizing” Indigenous peoples, thus giving rise to a tutelage policy that continues to this day. This history has made the demands for “self-determination and sovereignty” so important in the Canadian context, explaining why the treaties signed since the 1700s continue to be advanced both for their legal weight internationally and as tools for political struggle today, vexing as the Crown response typically turns out to be. The fact of the legal force of these treaties and of ongoing unceded land rights known as Aboriginal title, especially in the many Indigenous territories where no treaties were established, have been braced in the last thirty years by the inclusion of section 35 in the Canadian Constitution Act, 1982, which states, “The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.” Many Supreme Court decisions have followed, so shaping and authorizing such rights, but subordinating them to Canadian law, rather than in terms of the autonomous laws of Indigenous nations themselves (see McNeil 2018). Taken together, these conditions set out the coordinates for the decolonial projects and the forms of alliance making and positioning of anthropologists with Indigenous peoples, as discussed in this volume by Sherry Pictou, Jane McMillan, and Colin Scott.

The underlying Indigenous responses to the relentless control and brutality of colonization in countries like Canada have only relatively recently been seriously embraced in Australia by an increasing number of Indigenous academics and activists, influenced by the writings of Indigenous scholars from Canada and New Zealand in particular (e.g., Smith 2012; Andersen 2014; Coulthard 2014; Simpson 2014, 2017), which discuss sovereignty and decolonization as standpoints to address the ongoing effects of the colonial project (see Hutchings in this volume; also Moreton-Robinson 2015; Watson 2015).

In Mexico, the political and social life of Indigenous communities has been characterized by the coexistence of parallel spaces of government and Indigenous justice established since colonial times, when the Indian Laws recognized Indigenous jurisdictions subordinated to the Spanish Crown. The so-called Indigenous legal systems and today’s Indigenous municipalities have gone through several processes of reconstitution in permanent dialogue with the legal systems of postcolonial nation-states. The political demands of today’s Indigenous movements have focused on the recognition of community or municipal autonomy, which implies control over the land and territory, but
also recognition of their own forms of self-government and justice. More than ancestral political and legal systems, they are historical products that incorporate both Indigenous people’s own principles and epistemologies and Catholic moral and religious principles, which are the product of five hundred years of colonial occupation, as well as legal procedures incorporated from state justice. Although the liberal reforms of the nineteenth century imposed legal monism in most Latin American countries, these parallel systems continued to function in practice and were tolerated in many contexts, given the state’s inability to respond to the legal needs of Indigenous regions. These independent spaces are vindicated by autonomous Indigenous movements in Mexico.

A watershed in the history of Indigenous resistance in Mexico was the Zapatista uprising on January 1, 1994. Armed and unarmed troops of Tzeltal, Tsotsil, Tojolabal, Chol, and Mam peasants from the central highlands of Chiapas and the Lacandon jungle, formed the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN). The group’s name, method, and message invoked the spirit of the Mexican Revolution of 1910, as it put forward a platform of work, land, housing, food, health, education, independence, liberty, democracy, justice, and peace. Twelve days into an armed confrontation between the very poorly equipped EZLN and the Mexican Army, the government came to the negotiating table.

Shortly after the public emergence of the EZLN in January 1994, demands for Indigenous rights and self-determination began to take center stage in the Zapatista’s negotiations with the government and later grew to include a wide range of Indigenous communities, nations, and movements, which eventually consolidated into a national network. The Zapatista rebellion of 1994 initiated a nationwide process of reassessing the relationship between the Mexican state and Indigenous peoples.

For the last twenty-five years, the Zapatista movement has created its own autonomous regions and has centered the demands of Indigenous peoples in the national political debate. After the government failed to implement the peace accords with the EZLN, signed in 1996, Indigenous autonomy became the heart of the Zapatista project (see Mora 2018). Communities in Chiapas and in other regions of Mexico, such as Cherán in Michoacán, declared themselves autonomous regions and began implementing parallel governments and setting up their own systems of education, healthcare, agriculture, and more. The declarations and living experiments in autonomy at the local level in Chiapas connected to a larger national movement for Indigenous self-determination and rights that has denounced the continuity of the colonial project in contemporary Mexico.
These three colonial histories allow us to understand why the demands for sovereignty, autonomy, and the recognition of land rights and native title are so important for the Indigenous peoples of the three regions. Simultaneously, at a global level, we are witnessing the emergence of a new political identity involving the Indigenous, which has traveled through rural roads of five continents, reaching the most isolated villages through workshops, marches, or encounters. The global struggles for recognition of so-called Indigenous rights have started to articulate these various political and cultural identities to denounce the effects of colonialism in their lives and territories. Thus, in addition to the local terms for self-definition—Maya, Mi’kmaq, or Arrernte—a new sense of identity has been incorporated: being Indigenous, which has led to the development of an encompassing community with other oppressed peoples from around the world. This has come especially in the wake of the political fallout generated by Indigenous delegates from across the globe over their disappointment with the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), 2007, to seriously account for Indigenous concerns. It has been repeated with further disappointment over the failure of the UN to listen to subsequent attempts by Indigenous representatives for the UN to embrace change by challenging colonial governments to a point of true decolonization for world Indigenous peoples (e.g., Pictou, this volume; Holcombe, this volume; Watson 2017; Venne 2017, 163). Multiple analysts point out that the movement for Indigenous rights was born as a transnational movement (Brysk 2000; Niezen 2003; Tilley 2002) because since its inception, it transcended local struggles and self-definitions. These experiences of Indigenous activism have challenged the perspectives of national anthropological traditions, forcing us to establish transcontinental dialogues and question our own methodological nationalisms. Several chapters of this book are framed in this global context of struggles for the rights of Indigenous peoples, locating the debates in the national contexts of Canada, Mexico, and Australia, but in permanent dialogue with transnational Indigenous movements.

Knowledge Coproduction and Epistemic Dialogues

A common pursuit of all the authors in this book is the need to look for different ways to produce knowledge in dialogue or collaboration with Indigenous peoples of Canada, Mexico, and Australia. The challenge to the extractivist perspectives of social research, which are based solely on the researcher’s theoretical
or academic curiosity or the needs of the financing states or foundations, is reflected in the authors’ defense of knowledge coproduction.

Our discomfort with the role of “experts” that has been assigned, especially to those of us who participate in legal struggles, is problematized in several chapters. We analyze from several perspectives the challenge of destabilizing knowledge hierarchies through epistemic dialogues that recognize other ways of “being in the world,” while we use our anthropological knowledges as “expert knowledge” in the struggles for rights.

In one way or another, all the authors in this book confront positivist academies that defend a “neutral” and distant knowledge, disqualifying any research undertaken in alliance with movements for social justice by characterizing it as “ideological.” This book’s chapters refute this stance, defending the epistemic wealth implied in doing research in alliance or collaboration with Indigenous peoples, simultaneously asserting that social research can contribute to developing critical thought and to destabilizing the discourses of power, thus contributing to the struggles of movements that work toward social justice.

The three Indigenous anthropologists who participate in this collection—Sherry Pictou (Mi’kmaq from L’sïtkuk, Canada), Genner Llanes-Ortiz (Yucatec Maya from Mexico), and Suzi Hutchings (Central Arrernte from Australia)—and those who, without being Indigenous, work in alliance and collaboration with Indigenous peoples or movements, have set for ourselves the challenge, which has been inspired by an unceded Indigenous presence, of producing a type of knowledge that transcends the limited spaces of the academy. We believe, however, that critical thought is not at odds with scholarly rigor, and that building a research agenda in dialogue with the social actors with whom we work, rather than devaluing anthropological knowledge, bolsters it and allows us to transcend the limited borders of the academic world. It is also a space with which to include the dialogues with the Indigenous activists with whom we work and their own perspectives on justice and rights. Whether this be through showing how Indigenous native title applicants reinscribe a community Indigenous knowledge by combining archival material with knowledge handed down from ancestors to prove claims to territory (e.g., Hutchings, this volume); through the possibilities of the UNDRIP to provide a mechanism for Australian Aboriginal woman living in desert communities to assert a human rights agenda in combating family violence (Holcombe, this volume); through the use creative writing to denounce state patriarchal violence and institutional racism against Indigenous women (Hernández Castillo); or even through Mi’kmaw
worldviews merging with anthropological perspectives to confront new forms of colonialism as experienced by Native fishing families (Pictou, this volume).

But the “political alliances” and the “coproduction of knowledge” we undertake here have another sui generis characteristic: that we all work with fellow citizens with whom we relate, not only in solidarity with their struggles for justice, but through the common need to build fairer, more inclusive, and more sustainable national projects. In this regard, Colin Scott speaks to us not only of collaborative research projects, but also of collective life projects, whereby knowledge dialogues allow us to build shared futures that are more respectful of both nature and humans. Building those shared projects requires, as a first step, making our knowledge intelligible, opening ourselves to other ontologies or ways of being in the world, and allowing ourselves to destabilize our certainties. In this respect, Scott says,

"The first challenge for academic researchers is to nurture relations of knowledge coproduction that are intelligible from the perspective of Indigenous relationalities and life projects. Reciprocally, the life projects of researchers come to intersect with, if not be transformed by, those of Indigenous partners. Intersecting and allied projects lend endurance to knowledge co-production capable of building shared views and community in ways that might possibly collapse the usual hegemonies.

Along the same lines, in Xochitl Leyva Solano’s chapter, she invites us to produce insurrectionary knowledges and practices through joint work with Indigenous movements, allowing us to destabilize what she characterizes as “academic capitalism.” The Mexican anthropologist denounces the commodification of knowledge as part of a production chain that reproduces the academy’s own machinery for the benefit of several industries, including the book industry. Her call to seek more creative, inclusive, and “insurrectionary” ways of producing knowledge is the result of an awareness of the global process of commodification: “It is important to locate the other knowledge practices mentioned here, in contrast with those that emerged from the changes that have taken place since the 1980s, which have displaced public universities and inserted them in the market (Slaughter and Leslie 1999). The patterns of professional academic and scientific work have undoubtedly changed over the last hundred years, but we should place special emphasis on the drastic (not to say dramatic) changes resulting from the emergence of neoliberal global markets.”
This same influence of the political ideals of the Zapatista movement can be seen in the chapter by Genner Llanes-Ortiz, who vindicates Yucatec Maya pedagogies as ways of producing knowledge based on collective practice and through various textual strategies, including literature and art. As Colin Scott does, both Leyva Solano and Llanes-Ortiz set forth the need to work toward the construction of a collective life project that, as the Zapatista slogan says, may allow us to build “a world where many worlds may fit.”

Understanding academic knowledge as a space to contribute toward social justice, not only for Indigenous peoples, but for the broader society to which we belong, shifts the location of anthropology’s enunciation in these peripheral traditions. Almost two decades ago, Brazilian anthropologist Roberto Cardoso de Oliveira (1998) pointed out that anthropology in Latin America had created a new cognoscente subject, which was no longer a stranger constituted from the outside but a member of the society it studied, having implications regarding the place of the other being studied. This proposal has been revisited by Colombian anthropologist Myriam Jimeno Santoyo (2011) to write about the “citizen researcher,” noting that the work done by many of us who research our own national contexts revolves around a permanent interest in our own society and the way it is constituted, the social conditions of those being studied, and the repercussions of our own concepts. This place of enunciation, as citizens and researchers in our own national society, entails different ethical responsibilities than those involved in researching remote societies with little or no political ties. This is what Sherry Pictou calls “relational responsibility.”

It is important to recognize, however, that this citizen research does not necessarily imply a challenge to the structures of domination in the context of which we produce our knowledge. In Australia, as Suzi Hutchings writes in this volume, for instance, “The number of qualified Indigenous anthropologists working in native title . . . can be counted on one hand,” and this, it could be argued, contributes to an inability to contest the status quo, particularly from the citizen researcher who is also the Indigenous subject of anthropological investigation. Sarah Holcombe, also in this book, points out that their position as “conationals” is precisely what has kept many Australian anthropologists from delving into the issue of human rights violations against Aboriginal peoples. Holcombe points out,

Perhaps yet another reason that Australianist anthropologists have been tardy or dismissive of applying this rights discourse within the Australian context is
because of the “co-nationals” status of our “subjects,” as Jeremy Beckett (2010) has referred to the settler colony politic. For my purposes, this national anthropology identified by Beckett has had the instrumental effect of eliding the value of this rights discourse. Regardless of our ideological perspectives on the values of neoliberalism and formal rights or the welfare state and substantive rights, Indigenous Australians as cocitizens surely do not require the same recourse to human rights instruments as, say, those in war-torn or corrupt states in Africa or South America. As part of a stated multicultural Australia, the policy rhetoric of equality in Indigenous-focused policies such as “Closing the Gap” surely does not require recourse to human rights by activist anthropologists.

Resisting the temptation of self-complacency, this book’s authors recognize the limitations of a socially committed anthropology that remains marked by the hierarchies of knowledge characterizing the nation-states where we exercise our discipline. A permanent self-criticism and self-reflection regarding our own practice is the point of departure for the knowledge dialogues that we propose here.

Legal Activism and Rights Struggles

Another issue that traverses several of this book’s chapters is the tension between a critical standpoint regarding the legal apparatus as a neocolonial strategy of control and domination, on one hand, and the political possibilities that many Indigenous movements find in the appropriation of rights discourses and in strategic litigation for their defense, on the other. This paradox is described by Sherry M. Pictou in her chapter, when she notes, “Therefore, it is a tragic irony that Indigenous people would have to turn to the very legal system that all but destroyed them as a people in their struggle for Aboriginal and treaty rights.” Although most of the authors recognize this tension in what Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2002) calls the regulatory or emancipatory possibilities of the law, not all of them share the same standpoint regarding the dilemma. At least five of the book’s authors have participated in the elaboration of anthropological expert witness reports for the recognition of land rights (Holcombe and Hutchings), of Indigenous rights to livelihood fishing (Pictou and McMillan), and for the legal defense of Indigenous prisoners (Hernández Castillo). Yet, our assessment of anthropologists’ role as “experts” and of expert witness reports as political tools are very different.
In Australia, Suzi Hutchings and Sarah Holcombe document how the recognition of Aboriginal land rights since 1976 hegemonized the Native population’s human rights struggles, creating new political challenges and renewing neocolonial strategies. The so-called Justice Blackburn decision led to a debate regarding the Aboriginal population’s territorial rights, setting the bases for the enactment of the Aboriginal Land Rights Act in the Northern Territory in 1976. It was the struggle of the Yolngu people against the establishment of a bauxite mine in the Gove peninsula by the Nabalco Mining Company that revealed the absence of a legal framework to defend the common-law rights of the Aboriginal population. It was the first time that a Native population took a lawsuit to the Supreme Court, and unfortunately Justice Blackburn rejected their action, noting that Yolngu customary law included norms regarding land property, but that those norms had no legal standing nor were they recognized by the Australian government. As noted above, this case sparked the beginning of a struggle for recognition of Aboriginal land rights. It also led Meriam activist Eddie Mabo and his legal team to contest the colonial position established by the British that the common-law rights of Aboriginal people to hunt, fish, and observe traditional practices on the Gove peninsula had been extinguished with settlement. In 1992 a majority of High Court judges upheld the claim that the lands of Australia were not terra nullius. In Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2), the High Court acknowledged the existence of Aboriginal native title, finally leading to the establishment of native title rights in Australian law after more than two hundred years of British invasion and settlement of the continent.

This new legal framework, which could be interpreted as advancement in Indigenous peoples’ access to justice, implied a process of juridization of politics that, according to these authors, has been limited. The struggle for land rights and recognition of prior ownership has become central in Aboriginal peoples’ struggles, legitimizing essentialist discourses regarding “Indigenous authenticity” and excluding other rights discourses. It could be said that the Northern Territory Aboriginal Land Rights Act (1976) and the Native Title Act (1993) established the language on which resistance was based. Resorting to William Roseberry’s definition of hegemony, we could say that, in Australia, the land rights discourse developed “a common language or way of talking about social relationships that sets out the central terms around which and in terms of which contestation and struggle can occur” (Roseberry 1994, 360–61).

Many Australian anthropologists have focused their political efforts on the struggle for Indigenous property, contributing to the development of a legal
framework that legitimizes those rights and accompanying the demands for native titles with expert witness reports. Based on their experiences as experts in support of those struggles, Suzi Hutchings and Sarah Holcombe point out two main challenges set forth by this new hegemony of rights discourses. As an Aboriginal anthropologist who questions essentialist perspectives of identity, Hutchings maintains that the struggle for native titles revictimizes the population that has most suffered the impact of colonialism through dispossession and displacement. This Stolen Generation peoples, who were cast out of their lands, dispossessed of their language, and severed from their communal structures, face the most difficult challenges in order to “prove their indigeneity” and obtain their right to the land. The burden of proof is imposed on them based on authenticity criteria defined by the neocolonial state itself. Hutchings, with her double identity as an Indigenous woman and anthropologist, describes her situation as a “double-edged sword” and as “being stuck in the middle,” since she rejects the imposition of limited definitions of “tradition” to demand rights, yet, as an expert, she is obliged to follow the rules established by a system that she continues to recognize as colonial. Meanwhile, Sarah Holcombe reflects on how, by reducing the struggle for Indigenous peoples’ rights to land rights, many other aspects have been left out, such as a life free of violence for women or social rights, which are rarely considered in lawsuits that Australian anthropologists have supported. Both authors point out that while the recognition of land rights has implied what Peterson and Langton (1983, 3) describe as “regaining some fraction of the personal and group autonomy which existed prior to colonisation,” this autonomy has been marked by new forms of violence and exclusion.

Forty-two years have passed since the enactment of the Aboriginal Land Rights Act in the Northern Territory and twenty-five years since the passing of the Native Title Act. Yet, remarkably few native title claims are successful throughout Australia, and land rights remains the success of Indigenous groups legally identified as more authentically Aboriginal because they live in remote locations where it is easier to continue traditional cultural practices. Thus, most land rights are recognized for those people living in remote areas of the Northern Territory, Western Australia, and South Australia, where such recognition in general does not affect the interests of white Australians. Significantly, most of these regions remain characterized by social exclusion, extreme poverty, and violence.

In Canada, Jane McMillan and Sherry Pictou take as their starting point a decision by Canada’s Supreme Court known as *R. v. Marshall*, which recognizes
Indigenous peoples’ fishing rights. Based on the case of Mi’kmaw fisherman Donald Marshall Jr., who appealed the prohibition of commercial eel fishing, the Supreme Court recognized the validity of the treaties established in 1760 and 1761 between Mi’kmaw authorities and the British Crown, stating that fishing regulations, the establishment of prohibitions, and the requirement of special licenses violated such treaties, recognized by current-day governments.

Both authors write from a privileged position of deep immersion in the political milieus of Indigenous struggle in the settler-colonial state. Sherry Pictou is a Mi’kmaw woman and an Indigenous activist who has defended her people’s rights and, simultaneously, an Indigenous feminist anthropologist who aims at reflecting and theorizing on the political struggles in which she has participated. Jane McMillan was part of the legal team that worked on the *R. v. Marshall* case, as well as being an eel fisherwoman and now a legal anthropologist who knows the First Nations treaties and rights. Both authors defend activist research and the appropriation or mobilization of rights discourses, and they demonstrate the epistemic possibilities of doing research in collaboration with the social actors with whom we work. Rather than a limitation of the development of a “distant and objective” perspective, their participation in the struggles of the Mi’kmaq have allowed them to understand the internal challenges faced by the appropriation and use of rights discourses.

From different perspectives, both authors manage to maintain the tension as they “analyze the complex processes through which laws and policies shape social lives, and how legal disputes shape and alter cultural rights and governance practices” (McMillan, this volume), while they use these same legal strategies analyzed to advance in the struggle for access to justice.

In the Mexican context, R. Aída Hernández Castillo responds to those who claim that the choice is between two incompatible options: either you opt for a critical analysis of state legality, or you reproduce hegemonic standpoints regarding the law and rights by supporting legal activism. From this perspective, any legal activism reproduces hegemonic definitions of culture and Indigenous peoples, restricting the political imaginaries regarding justice (Brown and Halley 2002). Hutchings and Holcombe seem to share this reflection in their collaborations in this book, identifying the difficulties in challenging the social structures in Australia from within the discipline of anthropology, which has a significant history as a handmaiden to the colonial enterprise of the nation-state in relation to its Indigenous citizens. Differing from this standpoint, Hernández Castillo claims that it is possible to maintain a permanent critical reflection on
the law and rights, while supporting struggles for justice for Indigenous peoples and organizations, by appropriating and resignifying national and international legislations. Using as an example her experience in elaborating anthropological expert witness reports to support the defense of Indigenous women in national and international legal actions, the author demonstrates how the collective dialogues that have nurtured these expert reports have also contributed to a critical reflection on Mexico’s state justice.

The historical and geographic context, the organizational and political genealogies of Indigenous peoples, and the social fabric of the places where the struggles for rights take place determine the various forms and emancipatory or regulatory possibilities of legal activism and the potential effectiveness of anthropologists’ participation in those struggles. The different experiences analyzed here allow us to break away from generalizing perspectives of the law and rights as either simple tools of neocolonial states or as mere strategies of Indigenous resistance. The various aspects of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic, colonial and decolonial, processes are reconstructed in detail by each of the authors of this book.

The Book’s Chapters

The case studies analyzed in this volume do not attempt to be representative of the experiences of Indigenous peoples in each country, but they are examples of the efforts and challenges that anthropologists, Indigenous and non-Indigenous, confront when producing knowledge in alliances with Indigenous peoples. We were not able to address all the intraregional diversity in each country, because the complexity of each national context is beyond the scope of a single volume, but we hope that this first effort to build bridges between Mexico, Canada, and Australia will be the beginning of future political and academic dialogues.

We divided this collective book into three sections that correspond to the three geographic regions covered by the studies. Traveling from north to south, we start with the three case studies in Canada (See Map 1).

We begin our journey in Southwest Nova Scotia Mi’kmaw lands and waters, where the Bear River First Nation has been struggling for recognition of their territorial rights to fishing, hunting, and control over their natural resources. In this first chapter, entitled “What Is Decolonization? Mi’kmaw Ancestral Relational Understandings and Anthropological Perspectives on Treaty Relations,”
Mi’kmaw anthropologist Sherry M. Pictou analyzes the limitations of her people’s legal struggles and the new challenges they face with the arrival of private capital in the region’s fishing industry. As an activist researcher who has accompanied her people’s struggles for fifteen years as an adviser, educator, and representative of the Coordinating Committee of the World Forum of Fisher Peoples, the author turns her own experience as an activist/anthropologist into a window to reflect on the limits of academic decolonization.

Continuing in the same region of the world, in L. Jane McMillan’s chapter “Committing Anthropology in the Muddy Middle Ground,” she takes as her point of departure the same legal case regarding fishing rights to reflect on what she calls the ontological and political responsibilities implied in the struggle for Indigenous rights to their natural resources. Based on the *R. v. Marshall* case, the author analyzes the repercussions that the suitors’ cultural and political practices have on legal disputes. Through the processual perspective of legal anthropology, she analyzes the everyday struggles of Indigenous peoples to build their sovereignty and break away from current forms of neocolonial dependence.

Finally, we conclude our journey through Canadian territory with the work by Colin Scott entitled “Research Partnerships and Collaborative Life Projects.” In this chapter, the author explores the conditions and outcomes of knowledge coproduction involved in the partnership between anthropologists and First Nation people. In pursuing this concern, the chapter builds on the notion of collaborative “life projects” as part and parcel of research partnerships—underwritten by a sharing of values and agendas that have certain “ontological” preconditions and consequences. What do these life projects entail for the coproduction of knowledge about the world? How are they positioned within the larger community of life transcending the human? How is coproduced knowledge shaped by the relational ontology of reciprocity through which Cree hunters see—and potentially researchers and other citizens of the mainstream might come to understand—our relations within a larger community of life? These themes and perspectives are pursued in light of the author’s engagements with the James Bay Crees of Eeyou Istchee on themes of land rights, conservation, and alternative models of development over four decades.

Continuing our journey through the American continent, we move on to the cases in Mexico (see Map 2), beginning with R. Aída Hernández Castillo’s chapter “Legal Activism and Prison Workshops: The Paradoxes of Feminist Legal Anthropology and Cultural Work in Penitentiary Spaces,” in which the
author explores the possibilities and limitations of legal activism from the perspective of feminist anthropology. Based on two activist research experiences with incarcerated Indigenous women, the author reflects on the new ethical and political challenges posed by the elaboration of anthropological expert witness reports for the defense of Indigenous prisoners. She describes the experience of the Sisters of the Shadow Editorial Collective of Women in Prison (Collectiva Editorial de Mujeres en Prisión Hermanas de la Sombra), where she accompanied the elaboration process of life histories of imprisoned Indigenous women, through writing workshops that have served as spaces for collective reflection on the multiple exclusions experienced by imprisoned Indigenous and peasant women. She also describes her experiences as anthropological expert witness in defense of imprisoned Indigenous women, in particular in the case of Commander Nestora Salgado García, a member of the Regional Coordination of Communal Authorities (CRAC) of Guerrero, unjustly imprisoned for her participation in an Indigenous justice system.

Continuing with reflections on the epistemological and political possibilities of knowledge coproduction, Xochitl Leyva Solano, in her chapter “Decolonizing Anthropologists from Below and to the Left,” analyzes a sui generis experience of collective knowledge production and the elaboration of multilingual texts and audiobooks. Based on an analysis of the political and epistemic challenges posed by the Zapatista movement for Mexico’s academy, the author shares the experience of the Chiapas Network of Artists, Community Communicators, and Anthropologists (RACCACH), a collective of scholars, artists, and communicators who have worked together to create multimedia materials encompassing the written word, photography, and painting, in three Mayan languages and in Spanish. The pedagogies of self-reflection and collective production using various textual strategies are approached by the author as strategies to decolonize anthropology, seeking to confront what she calls “academic capitalism.”

We conclude the section on Mexico with the chapter entitled “Maya Knowledges, Intercultural Dialogues, and Being a Chan Laak’ in the Yucatán Peninsula,” by Yucatec Maya anthropologist Genner Llanes-Ortiz. In this chapter the author explores the current situation of Pan-Yucatec Maya social movements from the vantage point of the author’s collaborative work with and for activist networks and communities. This work offers an anthropological interpretation of the difficulties faced by Pan-Yucatec Maya individual and collective actors in defending their territorial, linguistic, and political rights. On being a chan laak’
(little brother) for these activists, the author contends that a body of Indigenous collaborative scholarship can be developed to fight discrimination and disempowerment, as well as to open up fruitful conversations with and for Indigenous rights demands in this context.

We begin the third section, devoted to Australia (see Map 3), with the work by Suzi Hutchings, “Indigenous Anthropologists Caught in the Middle: The Fragmentation of Indigenous Knowledge in Native Title Anthropology, Law, and Policy in Urban and Rural Australia.” In this chapter, the author discusses three issues related to native title from the position of an Indigenous anthropologist: the imposition of the burden of proof in native title for Aboriginal communities who have historically suffered removals from land and tradition as a result of colonization; how native title has become an illusory means to reempower disenfranchised urban and regional Aboriginal communities by providing a conduit to reinstate and redefine cultural tradition; and the invidious position of Indigenous anthropologists who work on native title claims involving rural and urban Aboriginal communities.

We continue our reflections on Australia with Sarah Holcombe’s chapter, “Eclipsing Rights: Property Rights as Indigenous Human Rights in Australia.” In this chapter the author takes as a point of departure the 1971 Justice Blackburn decision that culminated in the Aboriginal Land Rights Act to analyze the consequences of anthropological involvement in land struggles. She argues that anthropologists were strong advocates for the recognition of Indigenous property rights and were instrumental in developing the categories of law that now define Indigenous Australian land tenure in these legally discursive contexts. Since 1992, with the recognition of native title following the Mabo decision, even more anthropologists are involved in writing claims for recognition of native title or assisting with heritage clearances to facilitate land-use agreements. The comfort of this historical fit, however, has since been called into question, principally from within the discipline. An outcome of this abiding disciplinary focus on land rights is the eclipsing of other aspects of Indigenous human rights. The chapter analyzes how this focus on such a narrow form of cultural rights has uncoupled the anthropological project from the broader set of human rights concerns, and while this has created a legacy that is difficult to shift, it is also reflective of the broader Australian political milieu.

We conclude our book with the epilogue, written by Canadian anthropologist Brian Noble, our editorial partner, who was also one of the organizers of the panel that gave rise to this book. Based on his own experience as an activist...
anthropologist, he reflects on both the cross-cutting and the locally divergent praxes and conditions of the multiple colonialisms and the emergent counter-practices and antidotes posed by the authors gathered in this book. Drawing these together, he then suggests how the linked concerns and practices operate on two registers of decolonial action and alliance: one addressed to the disruptive promise of resurgent relations between Indigenous and non-Indigenous experts in their collaborations; the second addressed to the potential interruptive remaking and decolonizing of interpolitical relations between Indigenous peoples and the states in which their struggles have so vexingly played out up to the present. In this, he points to some of the parameters for alternative and plural praxes in modes of anthropological engagement discernible in this three-country consideration of the conditions of possibility for Indigenous practices of freedom.

Notes


3. Abya Yala means “land in its full maturity” or “land of vital blood” in the Kuna language and is the name used to refer to the American continent since before the arrival of Columbus. The continental Indigenous movement has decided to appropriate this term to refer to the Americas instead of the colonial terms of North America and Latin America.

4. There is an extensive bibliography written by Indigenous women intellectuals discussing their conceptions of gender justice and criticizing Western feminism (Summit of Indigenous Women of the Americas 2003; FIMI 2006; Méndez et al. 2013; Sánchez Néstor 2005). An analysis of these perspectives can be found in Hernández Castillo (2016).

5. The concept of communality was theorized at the end of the 1980s by the Ayuuk intellectual Floriberto Díaz (2007) to refer to the importance of internalized communal values and of how these values were converted into internalized cultural structures or habitus, which prioritized the “common good.” The values of collective solidarity, respect for Mother Earth, and promotion and defense of communitarian democracy were promoted by Floriberto Díaz in diverse spaces of political struggle, from the community level to the level of national and international forums. While Floriberto Díaz did not theorize in his writings about the specific rights of Indigenous women, his proposals have been taken up by a new generation

6. For indigenous critical and plural thinking, see, for example, Comunidad de estudios mayas (Maya studies community), last updated July 19, 2016, http://commaya2012.blogspot.mx/. For feeling-thinking (senti-pensar) indigenous theory, see Comunidad de historia mapuche (Mapuche history community), accessed September 13, 2018, https://www.comunidadhistoriamapuche.cl/quienes-somos/.

7. Among the exceptions are the comparative studies between Mexico and Canada by Isabel Altamirano-Jiménez (2013) and Cristina Oehmichen Bazan (2005), and between Mexico and Australia by Barry Carr and John Minns (2014) and Gabriela Coronado Suzán (2007).

8. For example, in 1990 the federal Labor government, under Prime Minister Bob Hawke, established the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC). This body, while always subject to government oversight, nevertheless consisted of elected Indigenous representatives whose goal was to overview government initiatives for Indigenous Australians by commentary and recommendations. ATSIC was dissolved under the federal Liberal government under Prime Minister John Howard in 2005.

9. Aboriginal Australians had many early encounters with traders, explorers, sealers, and whalers from Indonesia, Europe, and the Americas before a sustained period of British occupation of the country. For example, the French made landfall and named the town of Esperance in Western Australia in 1792, and this region had been consistently visited by American and French whalers and sealers since the early 1800s; Aboriginal people living in tropical Arnhem Land in northern Australia have traded with Makassan trepangers from Indonesia from the early 1700s (McIntosh 2000).


11. The first use of this term has been attributed to historian Peter Read in 1981 (Read 2006; Thomas 2010). It has now become synonymous with all those Aboriginal people who were removed from their communities and families as a result of government assimilation policies, as well as those people in succeeding generations who suffer intergenerational trauma because members of their families had been removed.

12. Kent McNeil (2018) discusses how by no means can Canada’s sovereignty be construed as legitimate unless it first acknowledges it is conferred by the acts of treaty making with Indigenous peoples, who have been acknowledged as sovereign peoples prior to colonial settlement in decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada.

13. In the so-called Laws of Indians (Leyes de Indios), book 5 legislates several aspects of public law, jurisdiction, functions, competency, and attributions of mayors, chief magistrates (corregidores), and other Indigenous lower civil servants.
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